The ability to generalize behaviour-guiding principles and concepts from experience is key to intelligent, goal-directed behaviour. It allows us to deal ef ciently with a complex world and to adapt readily to novel situations. We review evidence that the prefrontal cortex-the cortical area that reaches its greatest elaboration in primates-plays a central part in acquiring and representing this information. The prefrontal cortex receives highly processed information from all major forebrain systems, and neurophysiological studies suggest that it synthesizes this into representations of learned task contingencies, concepts and task rules. In short, the prefrontal cortex seems to underlie our internal representations of the 'rules of the game'. This may provide the necessary foundation for the complex behaviour of primates, in whom this structure is most elaborate.
INTRODUCTION
Although our brains have developed exquisite mechanisms for recording speci c experiences, it is not always advantageous for us to take the world too literally. A brain limited to storing an independent record of each experience would require a prodigious amount of storage and burden us with unnecessary details. Instead, we have evolved the ability to detect the commonalities among experiences and store them as abstract concepts, general principles and rules. This is an ef cient way to deal with a complex world and allows the navigation of many different situations with a minimal amount of storage. It also allows us to deal with novelty. By extracting the essential elements from our experiences, we can generalize to future situations that share some elements but may, on the surface, appear very different.
For example, consider the concept 'camera'. We do not have to learn anew about every camera that we may encounter. Just knowing that the item is a camera communicates a great deal of knowledge about its parts, functions and operations. Or consider the set of rules invoked when we dine in a restaurant, such as 'wait to be seated', 'order' and 'pay the bill'. These rules are long divorced from the speci c circumstances in which they were learned and thus give us an idea about what to expect (and what is expected of us) when we try out a new restaurant. Hearing that a 'coup d'etat' has occurred communicates the 'gist' of what happened without having to hear the details.
While much is known about the encoding of physical attributes and speci c experiences, relatively little is known about how abstract information is encoded in the brain. This may be because this is relatively more dif cult to study than the neural correlates of physical attributes, such as shape. By de nition, these categories and concepts are labels that transcend physical appearance. Think of all the wildly different-looking objects that are considered to be chairs. However, it is not always easy to disentangle encoding of categories from similarity. Let us say that we discover some neurons somewhere in a monkey's brain that become activated whenever it views a tree. Are these neurons really encoding the category 'tree'? They might be encoding the fact that trees happen to look more like one another than many other objects. Further, development of abstract representations requires a considerable amount of experience; learning a general principle requires a wide range of experiences so that underlying rules can be extracted.
Our laboratory has conducted experiments to establish how abstract information is represented in the brain. We trained monkeys on tasks that allowed them to group different stimuli and experiences into categories or behaviourguiding rules. We summarize some of that work and discuss its implications for an understanding of a neural basis of high-level cognitive function. We have focused on a brain region that is central to high-level cognitive function, the PFC.
THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX
The PFC is an ideal place to look for neural correlates of abstract information. It occupies a far greater proportion of the human cerebral cortex than in other animals, suggesting that it might contribute to those cognitive capacities that distinguish humans from animals (Fuster 1995 ; gure 1). On initial examination, PFC damage has remarkably little overt effect; patients can perceive and move, there is little impairment in their memory and they can appear remarkably normal in casual conversation. Abbreviations: a.s., arcuate sulcus; c.s., cingulate sulcus; g.pr., gyrus proreus; p.f., presylvian ssure; p.s., principal sulcus; pr.f., proreal ssure. From Fuster (1995) .
However, despite the super cial appearance of normality, PFC damage seems to devastate a person's life. They have dif culty in sustaining attention, in keeping 'on task', and seem to act on whims and impulses without regard to future consequences. This pattern of high-level de cits coupled with a sparing of lower-level basic functions has been called a 'dysexecutive syndrome' (Baddeley & Della Sala 1996) and 'goal neglect' (Duncan et al. 1996) . Indeed, the anatomy of the PFC suggests that it is wellsuited for a role as the brain's 'executive'. It can synthesize information from a wide range of brain systems and exert control over behaviour (Nauta 1971) . The collection of cortical areas that comprise the PFC have interconnections with brain areas processing external information (with all sensory systems and with cortical and subcortical motor system structures), as well as internal information (limbic and midbrain structures involved in affect, memory and reward) (see gure 2). Correspondingly, its neurons are highly multimodal and encode many different types of information from all stages of the perceptionaction cycle (Fuster 1995) . They are activated by stimuli from all sensory modalities, before and during a variety of actions, during memory for past events, in anticipation of expected events and behavioural consequences, and are modulated by internal factors such as motivational and attentional state (see the review in Miller & Cohen 2001) . Because of its highly multimodal nature and its apparent role in higher mental life, the PFC seemed like an ideal place to begin our search for neural correlates of the abstract information needed for intelligent behaviour. 
THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND PERCEPTUAL CATEGORIES
Because perceptual categories often group together very different looking things, their representation must involve something beyond the sort of neural tuning that underlies the encoding of physical attributes, that is, gradual changes in neural activity as certain attributes gradually change (e.g. shape, orientation, direction). Instead, categories have sharp boundaries (not gradual transitions) and members of the same category are treated as equivalent even though their physical appearance may vary widely.
Consider a simple example of a perceptual category: crickets sharply divide a certain range of pure tones into 'mate' versus 'bat' (a predator) (Wyttenbach et al. 1996) . Even though the input varies along a continuum, behaviour is binary. Across a wide range of lower frequencies, crickets will turn towards the sound source because it may be a potential mate. However, at a certain point (16 kHz), the behaviour suddenly ips: crickets begin to turn away from the sound source because it could be a bat. Crickets make virtually no distinction between frequencies over a wide range on either side of the boundary; they approach or avoid with equal reliability. This type of representation is illustrated schematically in gure 3. Presumably, the ability to transform the raw sensory inputs into distinct categories evolved because it is advantageous; in this case, it optimizes reproductive behaviour while minimizing fatal mistakes. Similar effects are evident in humans' perception of 'b' versus 'p' (Lisker & Abramson 1970) .
The elaborate behavioural repertoire of advanced animals naturally depends on more elaborate categorization abilities. The mental lexicon of primates, for example, includes abstract categories that are characterized along multiple dimensions that are often dif cult to de ne precisely, such as 'tool'. In addition, advanced animals have an enormous capacity to learn and adapt. Most of our categories are acquired through experience (we learn what a 'chair' is) and we can continually modify and update our categories as we learn more about them. The ability of monkeys to learn complex perceptual categories has been catalogued in studies that have taught them categories such as animal versus non-animal (Roberts & Mazmanian 1988) , food versus non-food (Fabre-Thorpe et al. 1998) , tree versus non-tree, shes versus non-shes (Vogels 1999a ) and ordinal numbers (Orlov et al. 2000) . Pigeons also have a remarkable ability to learn such distinctions (Bhatt et al. 1988; Young & Wasserman 1997) .
Where such categories are encoded in the brain is unclear. In primates, they could be represented and stored in the same areas of the visual cortex that analyse form and are critical for remembering individual objects, such as the ITC. They might also be evident in the brain regions that receive the results of visual processing from the ITC and are critical for planning and guiding behaviour, such as the PFC. Both the ITC and PFC contain neurons selective for complex stimuli such as trees, shes, faces, brushes, etc. (Desimone et al. 1984; Tanaka et al. 1991; Vogels 1999b sitions and little within-category distinction) cannot be tested. This is not to say that ITC neural selectivity would not make important contributions to category representation, it is just not clear whether it represents category membership per se.
To test for neural correlates of perceptual categories, we trained monkeys to categorize computer-generated stimuli into two categories, 'cats' and 'dogs' (Freedman et al. 2001; gure 4) . A novel three-dimensional morphing system was used to create a large set of parametric blends of six prototype images (three species of cats and three breeds of dogs) (Beymer & Poggio 1996; Shelton 2000) . By blending different amounts of cat and dog, we could smoothly vary shape and precisely de ne the boundary between the categories (greater than 50% of a given type). As a result, stimuli that were close to, but on opposite sides of, the boundary were similar, whereas stimuli that belong to the same category could be dissimilar (e.g. the 'cheetah' and 'house cat'). Two monkeys performed a DMC task ( gure 5) that required judgement of whether successively presented sample and test stimuli were from the same category or not. For training, samples were chosen from throughout the cat and dog morph space. After training, classi cation performance was high (ca. 90% correct), even when the samples were close to the category boundary. The monkeys classi ed dog-like cats (60% cat, 40% dog) correctly ca. 90% of the time, and misclassi ed them as dogs only 10% of the time, and vice versa. Thus, the monkeys' behaviour indicated the sharp boundary that is diagnostic of a category representation. The dog-like cats were treated as cats, even though they were more similar in appearance to the cat-like dogs just across the category boundary than they were to the prototype cats.
We recorded in the lateral PFC, the PFC region directly interconnected with the ITC, and found many examples of neurons that seemed to encode category membership. Two examples are shown in gure 6. Note that their Wyttenbach et al. (1996) . activity was different from dog-like (60%) cats and cat-like (60%) dogs, yet similar between these stimuli and their respective prototypes. In other words, PFC neurons seemed to make the same sharp distinctions that were evident in the monkeys' behaviour and are indicative of categorical representations, and collected different stimuli together irrespective of their exact physical experience. Category information seemed to predominate in the PFC; across the neural population, tuning was signi cantly shifted towards representing category rather than individual stimuli (Freedman et al. 2001) .
As our monkeys had no experience with cats or dogs prior to training, it seemed likely that these effects resulted from training. To test for learning effects, we retrained one monkey on the DMC task after de ning two new category boundaries that were orthogonal to the original boundary ( gure 4). This created three new classes; each contained morphs centred around one cat prototype and one dog prototype (e.g. the cheetah and the 'doberman'). After training, we found that PFC neural activity shifted to re ect the new, but not the old, categories. An example of a single neuron is shown in gure 7. It showed a signi cant effect of category during the delay period when data were sorted according to the (currently relevant) three-category scheme; it distinguished one of the categories from the other two ( gure 7a). By contrast, when the data were sorted using the old category scheme, there was no differentiation between the now-irrelevant cat and dog categories ( gure 7b).
Our results illustrate that, with experience, category information can become incorporated at the single-neuron level, much as physical attributes of stimuli are. This did not have to be the case: in principle, categories might have been encoded in another fashion. For example, categories might have been encoded at the ensemble level, as an emergent property of neurons that represent their de ning features. This ability to carve category membership into the tuning of single neurons may allow for the quick and effortless classi cation of familiar items.
Our results might re ect a relative specialization of the PFC in encoding category membership. Categories, after all, are typically de ned by their behavioural relevance, and the PFC plays a central part in planning voluntary behaviours. Conversely, the traditional roles of the PFC and ITC are in cognitive functions versus object vision and recognition, respectively. PFC damage causes de cits in attention, working memory and response inhibition, but usually spares object recognition, long-term memory and 'high-level' visual analysis (Fuster 1989; Miller & Cohen 2001) . By contrast, ITC damage causes de cits in visual discrimination and learning (Gross 1973; Mishkin 1982) and category-speci c agnosias (e.g. for faces) in humans (Gainotti 2000) . It might be that the category information in the PFC was retrieved from long-term storage in the ITC for its immediate use in the task. Interactions between the PFC and ITC underlie the storage and/or recall of visual memories and associations (Rainer et al. 1999; Tomita et al. 1999) . Tomita et al. (1999) demonstrated that top-down signals from the PFC were needed to activate long-term visual memories stored in the ITC. A similar relationship may exist for the recall of visual categories. In either case, it seems that category information is strongly represented in the PFC, a nding consistent with its role in high-level cognitive functions and in guiding behaviour. The relative contribution of the ITC remains to be determined.
THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND RULES
It is not only useful to group different sensory stimuli into meaningful categories, it is also useful to group speci c experiences of our interactions with the environment along common themes, that is, as behaviour-guiding principles or rules. To this end, our brains have evolved mechanisms for detecting and storing often-complex relationships between situations, actions and consequences. By gleaning this knowledge from past experiences, we can develop a 'game plan' that allows us to extrapolate and infer which goals are available in similar situations in the future and what actions are likely to bring us closer to them.
A standard behavioural test of rule learning in monkeys is conditional associative learning (Passingham 1993) . This refers to a class of tasks that require learning associative relationships that are arbitrary and extend beyond the simple one-to-one, stimulus-response mappings that underlie re exive reactions to the environment. In conditional learning tasks, a given input does not invariably lead to a given output. Whether or not a given response is successful depends on additional, contextual, information. For example, reaching for popcorn can be rewarding, but only if one takes other information into account; if the popcorn belongs to another person, the result could be disastrous. Taking into account complex relationships in order to decide between alternative actions is, presumably, why volition evolved.
To make predictions about which actions are likely to achieve a given goal in a given situation, we need to form a pattern of associations between their internal representations that describes their logical relationship (Dickinson 1980) . Decades of behavioural research have illustrated that the brain has learning mechanisms that are exquisitely sensitive to behaviourally informative associations (and Figure 5 . The delayed match-to-category task. A sample was followed by a delay and a test stimulus. If the sample and test stimulus were the same category (a match), monkeys were required to release a lever before the test disappeared. If they were not, there was another delay followed by a match. Equal numbers of match and non-match trials were randomly interleaved. From Freedman et al. (2001 Note that, in each case, the neuron's activity depends on both the cue object and the saccade direction and that the tuning is nonlinear or conjunctive. That is, the level of activity to a given combination of object and saccade cannot be predicted from the neuron's response to the other combinations. Adapted from Asaad et al. (1998). insensitive to, or even discount, associations that are not informative). The underlying neural ensemble of a goaldirected task, then, might be comprised of neurons whose activity re ects task contingencies. Many studies have shown that prefrontal neurons do have this property. This work has focused on the lateral PFC because it seems to be a site of convergence of the information needed to solve conditional sensori-motor tasks. It is directly intercon- . Spike rate versus time histograms for two neurons, each sorted by task. The nal second of the three-second ITI is represented by the rst 1000 ms (2 2000 to 2 1000 ms). Fixation occurs soon after (ca. 2 1000 to 2 800 ms). Cue presentation occurs at the time-point marked 0 ms. Task-related differences in baseline ring rate were generally observed to begin in the xation period. While the activity of some neurons diverged almost coincident with initial xation (c), the activity of others diverged progressively as the appearance of the cue became more imminent (a). The bar graphs (b,d ) demonstrate the reproducibilit y of these small task-speci c changes in activity across multiple repetitions of the same task. The mean xation-period ring rate (with standard errors) for each block of trials is shown for the two neurons in (a) and (c). The bars are colour-coded to re ect the task being performed in each block, and the colours match those in the histograms to the left. The light grey line superimposed over these bars shows the activity of these neurons during the second immediately preceding the ITI.
nected with the higher-order sensory and motor cortex and indirectly connected (via the ventromedial PFC) with limbic structures that process 'internal' information, such as memory and reward (Goldman-Rakic 1987; Pandya & Barnes 1987; Fuster 1989; Barbas & Pandya 1991) . The neural activity in the lateral PFC re ects this; many of its neurons exhibit multimodal responses (Vaadia et al. 1986; Watanabe 1992; Rao et al. 1997; Rainer et al. 1998a,b; White & Wise 1999) . Further, the lateral PFC is critical for normal learning of conditional associations between sensory cues and voluntary actions (Petrides 1985a (Petrides , 1990 Gaffan & Harrison 1988; Eacott & Gaffan 1992; Parker & Gaffan 1998b) . Indeed, following training on conditional learning tasks, as many as 50% of the neurons in the lateral PFC show conjunctive tuning for learned associations between cues, voluntary actions and rewards.
For example, Watanabe (1990 Watanabe ( , 1992 trained monkeys to perform tasks in which visual and auditory cues signalled, in different trials, whether a reward would or would not be delivered. The majority of lateral PFC neurons were found to re ect the association between a cue and a reward. A given neuron might be activated by a cue, but only when it signalled a reward. By contrast, another neuron might be activated only by a cue that signalled 'no reward'. In our own experiments, we have trained monkeys to associate, in different blocks of trials, each of two cue objects with an eye saccade to the right or to the left (Asaad et al. 1998) . We found that the activity of 44% of randomly selected lateral PFC neurons re ected associations between objects and the saccades that they instructed ( gure 8). Other neurons had activity that re ected the cues or the saccades alone, but they were fewer in number. Fuster et al. (2000) have recently shown that PFC neurons can also re ect learned associations between visual and auditory stimuli.
Importantly, these changes do not require a prodigious amount of experience. Changes in PFC neural properties are evident after one day's experience and can be detected after just a few minutes of training. For example, Bichot et al. (1996) studied the FEFs, part of Brodmann's area 8 that is important for voluntary eye movements. Normally, neurons in this area re selectively to saccade targets appearing in certain visual eld locations. However, when monkeys were trained to search for a target de ned by a particular visual attribute (e.g. red), the neurons in the FEFs acquire sensitivity to that attribute (Bichot et al. 1996) . When monkeys were trained to search for a different target every day, neurons not only discriminated the current target but also distracting stimuli that had been a target on the previous day relative to stimuli that had been targets even earlier (Bichot & Schall 1999) . Monkeys were also more likely to make errors in choosing that distracting stimulus. It was as though the previous day's experience left an impression in the brain that in uenced neural activity and the monkey's behaviour.
We also observed evidence for rapid plasticity in our study of learning of conditional object-saccade associations in the PFC (Asaad et al. 1998) . Initially, the monkeys chose their responses at random, but learned the correct cue-response pairing over a few (5-15) trials. As they learned the association, neural activity representing the forthcoming saccadic response appeared progressively earlier in successive trials. In other words, the initiation of response-related delay activity gradually shifted with learning-from a point in time just before the execution of the response and reward delivery to an earlier point in time, nearly coincident with the presentation of the cue.
Further support for a role for PFC neurons in representing task demands comes from training monkeys to alternate between different task rules. This adds another level of complexity beyond the conditional tasks described above. Now, there is more than one rule assigned to each cue and another cue tells the monkey which rule to use in a given trial. For example, following a given cue, monkeys can learn to direct a response to either the cue's location (spatial matching rule) or an alternative location associated with the cue (associative rule), depending on which rule is currently in effect. When tested in this fashion, many PFC neurons show rule-speci c activity. For example, a PFC neuron might respond to a given visual cue when the monkey is using an associative rule, but exhibit weak or no activity under identical sensory and attentional conditions that differed only in that the monkey was using a spatial rule instead (White & Wise 1999; Asaad et al. 2000) . Also, when monkeys switch between different tasks, many PFC neurons show shifts in baseline activity that communicates which task is currently being performed (Asaad et al. 2000; gure 9 ). Such effects have been found in the PFC for associative versus spatial rules, for object matching versus spatial matching versus associative rules, and for shape matching versus object matching rules (Hoshi et al. 1998; White & Wise 1999; Asaad et al. 2000) .
In all of these cases, however, the rules are relatively literal or concrete. A certain cue, or set of cues, always signals a speci c response. As noted, knowledge from our past experiences can be applied to a wider range of future circumstances if we abstract general principles or rules rather than speci c cue-response contingencies. The ability of the PFC to represent abstract rules, those not tied to speci c stimuli or actions, was recently addressed in our laboratory (Wallis et al. 2001) .
Monkeys were trained to use two abstract rules: 'match' versus 'non-match'. They faced a computer screen and viewed two successively presented pictures. If the match rule was in effect, the monkeys released the lever if the pictures were the same and continued to hold the lever if the pictures were different. If the non-match rule was in effect, the reverse was true; monkeys released if the picPhil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2002) tures were different and held if they were the same. The rule was randomly instructed in each trial by the presentation of a cue at the same time as the rst picture was presented. To disambiguate neuronal responses to the physical properties of the cue from responses to the rule that the cues instructed, cues signifying the same rule were taken from different modalities, while cues signifying different rules were taken from the same modality ( gure 10). The monkeys could perform this task well above chance levels even when they were seeing a stimulus for the very rst time. This indicates that they had abstracted two overarching principles of the task that could then be applied to novel stimuli-the minimal de nition of an abstract rule.
The most prevalent activity across the PFC was the encoding of the current rule. Figure 11 shows a good example of a rule-selective neuron that exhibited greater activity when the match rule was in effect than when the non-match rule had been indicated. This activity cannot be explained by the physical properties of the cue or the picture, since activity was the same regardless of which cue was used to instruct the monkey, and regardless of which picture the monkey was remembering. It cannot be related to the upcoming response since the monkey did not know whether the second-presented picture would require a response. Nor could it be related to differences in reward expectation, since the expectation of reward was the same regardless of which rule was in effect. Furthermore, the performance of the monkeys was virtually identical for the two types of rules (error rates differed by less than 0.1% and reaction times by less than 7 ms). Thus, the most parsimonious explanation is that the differences in activity re ected the abstract rule that the monkey was currently using to guide its behaviour.
What function does the ability to abstract a rule serve? It is a form of generalization that permits a shortcut in learning, thereby allowing the animal to maximize the amount of reward available from a particular situation. To illustrate this, consider the above task. The monkey could potentially solve the task as a series of paired associates (in fact, 16 associations, consisting of four different pictures each paired with four different stimuli). For example, the monkey might learn that whenever the chef is presented with a drop of juice, then at the test phase the correct response is to choose the chef. But notice that this type of learning tells the monkey nothing about which response is appropriate to a lion appearing with a drop of juice. In other words, unless the monkey abstracts the rule that juice indicates that the monkey should match, then each time new pictures are used the monkey would have to learn an entirely new set of 16 associations by trial and error. The problem with this trial-and-error learning is that errors are lost opportunities for reward. Given that the monkeys performed well above chance when they encountered novel pictures, it is clear that they are not engaging in trial-and-error learning, but rather have abstracted two rules that they can then apply as required.
This shortcut that abstraction of the rule permits is also re ected in the neuronal encoding. It would be entirely possible for the monkey to solve the task without single cells encoding the rule. For example, there might be two populations of cells, one encoding the match and nonmatch rule when the cues are presented in the auditory Monkeys switched between choosing a test stimulus that did or did not match the sample depending on whether the match or non-match rule was in effect. The cues that signalled these rules are shown on the left. modality, and one encoding this information in the taste modality. But such a solution is computationally expensive, since if a third modality was introduced a third population of cells would be required. It is more ef cient to abstract a rule that cues presented in different modalities commonly instruct, and indeed this is the solution that the brain uses. The prevalence of neurons encoding such rules in the PFC is consistent with the loss of exibility that is observed after prefrontal damage in both monkeys and humans. It is not inconsistent with studies emphasizing the role of the PFC in working memory or planning, but indicates that an important component of these processes might be the use of behaviour-guiding rules.
PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
The results presented above suggest that PFC activity re ects categories and rules. This seems consistent with conjectures that a cardinal PFC function may be the acquisition and representation of the formal demands of tasks, the guiding concepts and principles that provide a foundation for complex, intelligent behaviour. In order to understand this, we must turn to theories of cognitive control-the ability of the brain to coordinate processing among its millions of neurons in order to direct them toward future goals.
(a) Controlled versus automatic behaviours
In order to understand what we mean by 'cognitive control', it is important to understand the distinction between controlled and automatic behaviours. Much of our behaviour is automatic, that is, direct reactions to our immediate environment that do not tax our attention. For example, if someone suddenly throws a baseball at your face, you might re exively duck. You may not have willed this behaviour; it just seems to happen. Many such re exive, automatic processes are 'wired' into our nervous systems by evolution. However, others can be acquired through a great deal of experience, as learning mechanisms gradually imprint highly familiar behaviour. If you are walking a highly familiar route and traf c is light, you may traverse a great distance (and even negotiate turns) with little Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2002) awareness of having done so. In these cases, your behaviour is driven in a 'bottom-up' fashion: largely determined by stimuli in the immediate environment and their ability to trigger behaviours with which they are strongly associated. In neural terms, they are dependent on wellestablished neural pathways waiting to be red off by the correct input.
However, if something unexpected happens on your walk, you need to 'take charge' of your actions. You pay attention to your surroundings and try to anticipate and accommodate the action of others; you may even decide to take an alternative route. In this case, your behaviour is not governed by simple input-output, stimulus-response relationships. You use your knowledge of the world: the current objective (arriving at work intact) and results from previous experiences to weigh the alternatives and consequences. Because these behaviours tax your attention and seem to be driven by 'internal' information (knowledge about unseen goals and how to achieve them) and thus are initiated by us and not by the environment, they are referred to as 'controlled'. The same basic sensory, memory and motor processes that mediated automatic behaviour can be engaged. However, now they are not simply triggered by the environment, they are shaped and controlled in a top-down fashion, by our knowledge of how the world works. The observations that PFC neurons encode acquired information about task contingencies, categories and rules suggest it as a source of top-down signals.
The observation that humans with PFC damage seem impulsive makes sense in light of this distinction between controlled and automatic behaviours. Without the PFC to provide top-down signals about expectations of goals and required behaviours, the patient simply reacts to their environment with whatever behaviours are strongly associated with the cues that are immediately present. Shallice & Burgess (1991) examined this by using a 'shopping test'. They described frontal lobe-damaged patients who are able to execute simple routines in which clear sensory cues could elicit a familiar action (e.g. buy a loaf of bread). However, they were unable to carry out an errand that involved organizing a series of such routines because they kept going 'off task'. They would, for example, enter shops that were irrelevant to the errand, just because they happened to be passing them. Another example is utilization behaviour. A patient with PFC damage will impulsively use items placed in front of them such as a comb or, in (hopefully) one case, a urinal. It seems that the basic elements of behaviour are intact, but that the patients override prepotent, re exive, responses to coordinate behaviour in accord with an unseen goal.
A classic test of the ability to learn and follow goalorientated rules is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Milner 1963) . Subjects are instructed to sort cards according to the shape, colour or number of symbols appearing on them. They start with one rule (e.g. colour) and, once that is acquired, the rule changes until all of the cards have been sorted using all possible rules. Normal humans have little dif culty with this task. By contrast, humans with prefrontal damage can learn the rst sorting criterion (a relatively simple mapping between a stimulus attribute and a response) but then are unable to escape it; they cannot override the previous behaviour and do not realize that when the rule changes and they must learn a new one (Milner 1963) . Monkeys with PFC lesions are impaired in similar tasks (Dias et al. 1996) . PFC damage in humans or monkeys, or disconnecting the PFC from its sensory inputs in monkeys, also produces de cits in a standard test of rule learning, the aforementioned conditional learning tasks (Petrides 1985a,b; Gaffan & Harrison 1988 Murray & Wise 1997; Parker & Gaffan 1998a; Murray et al. 2000) .
(b) A theory of the prefrontal cortex and cognitive control In summary, we have seen that PFC damage seems to disrupt cognitive control, the ability of animals to direct action toward unseen goals, and leaves them at the mercy of the environment. We discussed neurophysiological studies that indicate that the PFC represents task-relevant knowledge such as categories and rules. How these properties are acquired, and how they are used for cognitive control, have been addressed in a model of PFC by Miller and Cohen (Miller & Cohen 2001) .
In this view, the ability to form representations of the formal demands of behaviour stems from the position of the PFC at the top of the cortical hierarchy (Fuster 1995) . The PFC is a network of neural circuits that is interconnected with cortical regions that analyse virtually all types of sensory inputs, and with regions involved in generating motor outputs. It is also in direct contact with a wide array Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2002) of subcortical structures that process, among other things, 'internal' information such as motivational state. The PFC thus provides a venue in which information from distant brain systems can interact through relatively local circuitry. During learning, reward-related signals could act on the PFC to strengthen pathways-the associative links-between the neurons that processed the information that led to a reward. As a result, the PFC rapidly constructs a pattern of activity that represents goals and the means to achieve them. This, in essence, is a representation of the logic of the task, a task model that re ects the constellation of relevant information and their interrelations. In neural terms, this could amount to a 'map' of the neural pathways in the brain that is needed to solve the task. Cognitive control results from the PFC sending excitatory signals from this representation back to the brain structures that provide the PFC with input. These signals arise from the ability of many PFC neurons to sustain their activity. These chronic signals re ecting the task demands can enhance the activity of neurons that process task-relevant information (that match the model) in other brain systems and thereby select the forebrain neural pathways that are needed to solve the task at hand.
To understand how this selection takes place, consider visual attention. In the visual system, neurons processing different aspects of the visual scene compete with each other for activation, by mutually inhibiting one another. This is thought to be important for enhancing contrast and separating a gure from its background. The neurons that 'win' the competition and remain active are those that incur a higher level of activity. The biased competition model posits that visual attention exploits this circuitry (Desimone & Duncan 1995) . In voluntary shifts of attention, a competitive advantage comes from excitatory signals (thought to originate from the PFC) that represent the expected stimulus. These excitatory signals enhance the activity of neurons in the visual cortex that process that stimulus and, by virtue of the mutual inhibition, suppress activity of neurons processing other stimuli. This notion of excitatory bias signals that resolve local competition can be extended from visual attention to cognitive control in general (Miller 1999 (Miller , 2000 . By enhancing the activity of neurons representing task-relevant information, those representing irrelevant information are simultaneously suppressed and neural activity is steered down the pathways needed to solve the task at hand. For an illustrative example of how this might work, consider the cartoon shown in gure 12. Processing units are shown that correspond to cues (C1, C2, C3). They can be thought of as neural representations of sensory events, internal states, stored memories, etc. in corresponding neural systems. Also shown are processing units that correspond to the motor circuits mediating two responses (R1 and R2). We have set up the sort of exible situation for which the PFC is thought to be important. Namely, one cue (C1) can lead to one of two responses (R1 or R2), depending on the situation (C2 or C3). Imagine that you suddenly decide that you want a beer (and let us consider that to be cue C1). If you are at home (C2), then you get up and get one (R1). But if you are in a pub (C3), you ask for one instead (R2). These conditional associations form the 'if-then' rules that are fundamental building blocks of voluntary behaviour (Passingham 1993 In an unfamiliar situation, information ows into the PFC relatively unchecked. But then reward-related signals from successful (rewarded) experiences foster the formation of associations between the PFC neurons that had processed the information immediately preceding reward. This signal may be an in ux of dopamine from the midbrain VTA neurons that are sensitive to reward and, through the basal ganglia, in uence the PFC (Passingham 1993; Schultz & Dickinson 2000) . As this neural ensemble becomes established, it becomes self-reinforcing. It sends signals back to other brain systems, biasing their processing towards matching information and thus re ning the inputs to the PFC. As learning proceeds, rewardrelated signals from VTA neurons appear progressively earlier as they become evoked by the events that rst predict reward (Schultz & Montague 1997) . Through repeated iterations of this process, more and more taskrelevant information is linked into the PFC representation; it 'bootstraps' from direct associations with reward to a multivariate network of associations that can describe a complex, goal-directed task.
Once the PFC representation is established, a subset of the information (such as the cues) can activate the remaining elements (such as the correct response). So, if we want a beer (C1) and we are at home (C2), the corresponding PFC representation containing the correct response (R1) is activated and sustained until the response is executed. The resulting excitatory bias signals from the PFC then feed back to other brain regions, selecting the appropriate pathway needed for the task (e.g. C1-R1). A different pattern of cues (e.g. cues 1 and 3 in gure 12) evokes a different PFC model and a different pattern of bias signals selects other neural pathways (C1-R2). With repeated selection of these pathways, they can become established independently of the PFC. As this happens, the PFC becomes less involved and the behaviour becomes habitual or automatic.
This particular view of PFC function is not without peer or precedent. Fuster rst proposed that PFC neurons encode task-relevant contingencies between stimuli and/or responses, particularly when they are separated by gaps in time (as so often happens with extended, goal-directed behaviours) (Fuster 1985) . Neurons that explicitly encode task contingencies and rules are used in neural network models of cognitive control by Changeux and Dehaene (Changeux & Dehaene 1993; Dehaene et al. 1998 ). The models of Cohen and colleagues use a layer (thought to correspond to the PFC) that represents task demands or 'context' (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992) . Wise et al. (1996) proposed that a cardinal PFC function is the acquisition of behaviour-guiding rules. Shimamura independently proposed a role for the PFC directly analogous to the Miller and Cohen model (Shimamura 2000) . Central to our model, and indeed all physiologically inspired models of PFC function, is the ability of PFC neurons to sustain their activity for several seconds in the absence of further stimulation. This is crucial for several reasons. As previously mentioned, gaps in time are an inevitable consequence of extended goal-directed behaviours. Thus, sustained activity allows PFC neurons to learn relationships (associations) between stimuli and/or responses that are separated in time (Fuster 1985) . It also allows task rules to be maintained until the task is com-pleted. But conveying information by sustained activation affords more than the ability to bridge temporal gaps. O'Reilly and Munakata have pointed out that it is an ideal format for transmitting the knowledge needed for cognitive control to other brain systems (O'Reilly & Munakata 2000) .
A tenet of modern neuroscience is that long-term storage in the brain depends on strengthening some neural connections and weakening others, that is, by changing synaptic weights. Encoding information in structural changes has obvious advantages for information storage; it allows for very long-term memories. But the resulting memories are relatively in exible; once a neural circuit is established, it will tend to re in the same way every time it is triggered. Also, changing the strength of a synapse only affects the neurons that share the synapse. Thus, the information encoded in a pattern of synaptic weights only affects the ring of the neurons that form that particular circuit and is only expressed when that circuit is red. Cognitive control, however, requires that a given pattern of information (the task demands) affect many brain circuits; it is used to orchestrate processing in many different brain systems. It is apparent, therefore, that the information needs to be encoded in a different format. Sustained activity is such a format. Because information is encoded in a pattern of sustained activity (rather than only in a pattern of synaptic weights), it can be propagated across the brain. Thus, the ability of sustained activity to tonically in uence other brain systems is probably important for coordinating diverse processing around a speci c goal. It also affords exibility; if cognitive control stems from a pattern of information maintained in the PFC, changing behaviour is as easy as changing the pattern (O'Reilly & Munakata 2000; Miller & Cohen 2001) .
Finally, the central role of sustained activity might explain the severely limited capacity of controlled processes. While we can carry out a number of automatic processes simultaneously, our ability to carry out controlled processes is limited by the low capacity of our attention. If the information for cognitive control is expressed in a unique pattern of ongoing activity distributed across many simultaneously active neurons-a population code-then there will be a natural capacity limitation. Trying to represent more than just a few items at the same time would degrade information because the unique patterns impinging on a given set of neurons would overwrite and interfere with one another.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ability to take charge of one's actions and direct them towards future, unseen goals is called cognitive control. Virtually all theories of cognition posit that cognition depends on functions specialized for the acquisition of information about goals and the means to achieve them. These functions exert a top-down in uence on the lowerlevel automatic processes that mediate sensory analysis, memory storage and motor outputs, orchestrating and directing them toward a given goal.
The PFC, a brain structure that reaches its greatest complexity in the primate brain, seems to have a central role in cognitive control. It has access to, and the means to in uence processing in, all major forebrain systems and Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2002) can provide a means to synthesize the diverse information related to a given goal. As we have established, PFC neurons seem to have a crucial ability for cognitive control; they convey the knowledge that animals acquire about a given goal-directed task. Their ability to develop abstracted representations frees the organism from speci c associations and endows it with the ability to generalize and develop overarching concepts and principles. This ability is consistent with observations of a loss of exibility after PFC damage and may form a foundation for the complex, intelligent behaviour that is often seen in primates.
